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REDUCTION OF EARNINGS AND PROFITS TO REFLECT
THE BARGAIN SPREAD ACCOMPANYING RESTRICTED
STOCK OPTIONS
Financial accounting procedures direct that a corporation reduce
its earnings and profits to compensate for the difference between the
amount paid by an employee for the corporation's stock purchased
pursuant to a stock option plan and the market price of that stock
existing at the time that the terms of the option are fixed for a
particular employee.' This reduction is required to avoid the over-
statement of corporate income that would result if no attempt was
made on the corporate balance sheet to reflect the cost of compensa-
tion paid for services received.2 Despite the desirability of concur-
rent accounting for both tax and balance sheet purposes, 3 the Tax
Court and two federal courts of appeals4 have held that other meth-
ods should be used in the corporation's tax accounting for the bar-
gain spread inherent in the restricted stock options authorized by
section 424 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954.5 It is the conten-
tion of this Comment that the generally accepted accounting proce-
dure (GAAP) reflects financial reality better than does the alterna-
tive utilized by the Tax Court and avoids the unwarranted share-
holder tax benefits portended by the accounting method of the ap-
1. See maniUCAN INsnrmm OF CErIIE PUBuc ACCoUNTAM (AICPA), OPINIONS OF THE
ACCOUNTING PtNcrPLEs BOARD No. 25, ACCOUNTING FOR STOCK ISSUED TO EMrLOEEs (1972);
AICPA, AccoUmIG RESEARCH BuLrN No. 43, ch. 13B (1953).
2. AICPA, ACCOUNTING REsERic BuL-T No. 43, ch. 13B (1953).
3. Commentators have recognized both the general desirability and the occasional impossi-
bility of achieving uniformity between tax and financial accounting. See, e.g., Carley,
Important Areas in Which Book Accounting Differs from Tax Accounting; Tax and Nontax
Results; Requirements of Federal and State Regulatory Agencies, N.Y.U. 26TH INST. ON FED.
TAX. 541 (1968); Cohen, Accounting for Taxes, Finance and Regulatory Purposes-Are Vari-
ances Necessary?, 44 TAxEs 780 (1966); Address by then Assistant Secretary of the Treasury
Stanley S. Surrey, 25 J. TAx. 325 (1966).
Section 446(a) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 directs that taxable income be com-
puted in the same manner that the taxayer regularly keeps his books. The statutory. and
judicially created exceptions to this general rule are numerous, however. Seegenerally Ameri-
can Automobile Ass'n v. United States, 367 U.S. 688 (1961); Hagen Advertising Displays, Inc.
v. Commissioner, 407 F.2d 1105 (6th Cir. 1969); Artnell Co. v. Commissioner, 400 F.2d 981
(7th Cir. 1968).
4. See Divine v. Commissioner, 500 F.2d 1041 (2d Cir. 1974), reu'g 59 T.C. 152 (1972);
Luckman v. Commissioner, 418 F.2d 381 (7th Cir. 1969), revug 50 T.C. 619 (1968); Note,
Employee Stock Options: The Effect Upon A Corporation's Earnings and Profits, 33 MD. L.
REv. 190 (1972); 39 U. CN. L. REv. 384 (1970).
5. See note 8 infra.
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pellate courts. Despite the progressive retirement of restricted stock
option plans by Congress, a determination of the appropriate earn-
ings and profit treatment of the bargain spread is necessary for the
plans still in existence and, to an extent, for the qualified stock
option and employee stock purchase plans now favored.
Prior to January 1, 1964, the Internal Revenue Code empowered
corporations to grant selected employees restricted stock options
with which to purchase shares of the corporation's stock at a bargain
price as low as 85 percent of fair market value on the date the
options were granted.8 An employee electing to pursue the benefits
of such a plan would exercise his option by purchasing stock at the
agreed price generally within the succeeding 10 years,' presumably
at a time when the market value of the stock had risen above the
level existing on the date of grant. Although the option spread at
exercise, the market value of the stock at date of exercise less the
agreed purchase price, constitutes economic gain to the exercising
employee, the Code postpones taxation of any portion of this spread
to the employee until his realization of income upon his ultimate
disposition of the stock.10 The Code does not set forth expressly,
6. See note 8 infra.
7. See INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, §§ 421-23.
8. INT. REv. CODE oF 1954, § 424(b) provides:
For purposes of this part, the term "restricted stock option" means an option
granted after February 26, 1945, and before January 1, 1964... to an individ-
ual, for any reason connected with his employment by a corporation, if granted
by the employer corporation or its parent or subsidiary corporation, to purchase
stock of any of such corporations, but only if-
(1) at the time such option is granted-
(A) the option price is at least 85 percent of the fair market value at
such time of the stock subject to the option, or
(B) in the case of a variable price option, the option price (computed
as if the option had been exercised when granted) is at least 85 percent
of the fair market value of the stock at the time such option is granted
Restricted stock options still may be granted to employees provided that the options are
granted pursuant to a plan or contract adopted prior to January 1, 1964, and the plan operates
as a section 423 employee stock purchase plan. See id. §§ 424(b), (c)(3).
9. Id. § 424(b)(4).
10. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 421(a) provides:
If a share of stock is transferred to an individual in a transfer in respect of
which the requirements of section 422(a) [qualified stock options], 423(a)
[employee stock purchase plans], or 424(a) [restricted stock options] are
met-
(1) except as provided in section 422(c)(1), no income shall result at the time
of the transfer of such share to the individual upon his exercise of the option
[Vol. 16:373
1974] BARGAIN SPREAD
however, all of the consequences of the grant or the exercise of the
option for the corporation; section 421(a)(2) forbids the offering cor-
poration from deducting the option spread from gross taxable in-
come as a business expense," but nowhere does the Code specify
whether the corporation may reduce its earnings and profits by an
equivalent amount. 2
The earnings and profits treatment of any particular transaction
is crucial for determining whether a subsequent distribution by the
corporation to its shareholders is to be deemed a dividend taxable
to the shareholder as ordinary income, a capital gain receiving spe-
cial tax treatment, or a nontaxable return of capital.13 For a corpo-
rate distribution to be deemed a dividend, it must by definition be
paid out of the corporation's earnings and profits." Therefore, if
earnings and profits may be reduced by the bargain spread inherent
in a stock option, it is possible for earnings and profits to be so
diminished that a distribution of corporate assets occurring in the
with respect to such share;
(2) no deduction under section 162 (relating to trade or business expenses)
shall be allowable at any time to the employer corporation, a parent or subsidi-
ary corporation of such corporation, or a corporation issuing or assuming a stock
option in a transaction to which section 425(a) [corporate reorganizations]
applies, with respect to the share so transferred; and
(3) no amount other than the price paid under the option shall be considered
as received by any of such corporations for the share so transferred.
The purchase of stock by an employee possessing a restricted stock option is treated as a
capital purchase transaction. The employee receives no income at the time of acquiring the
stock in the amount of the "bargain spread." Upon disposition of the stock he is, however,
taxed on any increase in value above his purchase price at capital gains rates. H.R. REP. No.
749, 88th Cong., 2d Sess. 4 (194), in 1 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News 1371-72 (1964).
11. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 421(a)(2).
12. There is no comprehensive statutory definition of the term "earnings and profits," nor
any comprehensive statement of the effect of transactions upon earnings and profits. B.
BrrrKER & J. EusucE, REnmAL Itco~m TAXATION OF CORPORATONS MD SHAP HOLERS V 7.03,
at 7-9 (3d ed. 1971). Although Congress has prescribed the effect certain transactions will
have on corporate earnings and profits, the determination of the effect of most transactions
has been left to judicial or administrative determination. Id. at 7-10. The earnings and profits
of a corporation for a year are determined by making adjustments to its taxable income;
income which may not be taxed by the federal government under the Constitution will be
included in earnings and profits. For example, depletion expenses, while they may be de-
ducted in computing taxable income, may not reduce earnings and profits. Tress. Reg. §
1.312-6(c) (1973). Basically, whether a transaction affects earnings and profits involves a
question of how the transaction should affect the distribution made by the corporation to a
shareholder after the transaction has occurred. See generally B. Brrraaa & J. EusricE, supra,
7.03, at 7-12.
13. INT. Rv. Con OF 1954, § 301(c)(3)(B).
14. Id. § 316(a).
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same taxable period as the deduction will avoid dividend treatment
to the extent that it exceeds the remaining accumulated and current
earnings and profits. 5 Because the employee presumably would ex-
ercise his option at a time when the market value of the stock has
risen above the level existing when he received the option, the
GAAP method of reducing earnings and profits by the option spread
at the time shares are committed to the option normally should
produce less of a reduction, thus less chance of avoiding dividend
treatment, than would the alternative of reducing earnings and
profits by the amount of the option spread at exercise. If neither the
option spread at commitment nor at exercise is determined to be
deductible, then the possibility of avoiding dividend treatment for
concurrent distributions is decreased further.
JuDICAL MErHODS
Federal courts of appeals now have twice disagreed with the Tax
Court regarding the reduction of earnings and profits during the
year stock is sold to employees pursuant to a restricted option plan.
The Courts of Appeals for the Seventh and Second Circuits in
Luckman v. Commissioner"5 and Divine v. Commissioner,1 7 respec-
tively, have sanctioned reduction by the amount of the spread at
exercise, in each instance overturning a Tax Court decision that
would have denied any reduction. No one of the four decisions,
however, analyzed the GAAP alternative of reducing earnings and
profits by the amount of the spread existing when the corporation
committed shares to the option.
Divine and Luckman, in their capacity as shareholders of the
Rapid American Corporation (Rapid), received a total of $76,391.19
in cash distributions from the company in respect of their stock
during 1961 and 1962.18 Pursuant to a restricted stock option plan
15. Under existing tax accounting treatment of "dividends" and "earnings and profits,"
taxable dividend distributions must first be made out of current earnings and profits before
any return of capital can be made. If the aggregate value of the dividend distributions exceeds
the earnings and profits for the current year, the additional distributions must be made out
of accumulated earnings and profits. If there are insufficient current and accumulated earn-
ings and profits to cover the total value of the distributions, only then can they be treated as
nontaxable returns of capital. See Rudick, "Dividends" and " Earnings or Profits" Under the
Income Tax Law: Corporate Non-Liquidation Distributions, 89 U. PA. L. REV. 865, 869-7.2
(1941).
16. 418 F.2d 381 (7th Cir. 1969), rev'g 50 T.C. 619 (1968).
17. 500 F.2d 1041 (2d Cir. 1974), rev'g 59 T.C. 152 (1972).
18. 59 T.C. at 154; 50 T.C. at 621.
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offered officers and key employees during those years, 9 shares of
Rapid with a fair market value of $5,671,120 were purchased by
option holders for $2,044,748.20 Although prevented from taking any
deduction from taxable income by section 421 of the Code,21 Rapid
did reduce its financial balance sheet earnings and profits by the
$3,626,372 option spread at exercise.2 Since this reduction elimi-
nated Rapid's current and accumulated earnings and profits, it in-
formed its shareholders that the cash distributions made in 1961
and 1962 represented nontaxable returns of capital rather than divi-
dends taxed at ordinary income rates.-3 The Internal Revenue Serv-
ice (IRS) asserted instead that the distributions to Divine and Luck-
man were not returns of capital but taxable gross income embraced
within the meaning of section 61 of the Code because Rapid's earn-
ings and profits reduction was invalid. Failing to obtain redetermi-
nations of their purported tax liability upon separate petitions to
the Tax Court, Luckman and Divine nonetheless succeeded in per-
suading appellate courts that the distributions were not taxable.2
In both its Luckman and Divine decisions, the Tax Court adopted
the position that the options granted did not constitute compensa-
tion and thus did not warrant a reduction in earnings and profits
as an expense of producing earnings. Searching for congressional
guidance in legislative history, the Tax Court found certain excerpts
from the Senate Report to be persuasive evidence that restricted
stock option plans were to be used as "incentive devices by corpora-
tions who wish to attract new management, to convert their officers
into 'partners' by giving them a stake in the business. . or to give
19. 50 T.C. at 622.
20. 59 T.C. at 155.
21. See note 10 supra.
22. 59 T.C. at 155.
23. 59 T.C. at 153; 50 T.C. at 621.
24. Divine contended less successfully that the decision by the Court of Appeals for the
Seventh Circuit in Luckman v. Commissioner, 418 F.2d 381 (1969), collaterally estopped the
Commissioner of Internal Revenue from relitigating the issue of whether Rapid's earnings and
profits should have been reduced by the option spread at exercise. 500 F.2d at 1045. The Court
of Appeals for the Second Circuit held that the service was not bound by the determination
made in Luckman since Divine was not a party to that action. The court in Divine upheld
the traditional requirement of "mutuality" that a person not a party to an action cannot
apply collateral estoppel against a party unless the one invokingthe doctrine is himself bound
by the former judgment. Id. The court of appeals stated that if the Commissioner were bound
by a determination made in one court of appeals, the chances of having tax questions resolved
would be hindered, since the Supreme Court rarely grants certiorari for such cases unless
there is a conflict between the circuits. Id. at 1049.
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employees generally a more direct interest in the success of the
corporation. . . .Since the options which qualify for special treat-
ment are regarded as incentive devices rather than compensation,
no deduction is allowed the corporation.""s
When Congress initially considered restricted stock options, 21 the
income tax regulations discouraged employee stock purchase bene-
fits by treating all option spreads as ordinary taxable income real-
ized on the date of exercise.Y The statutory stock option device was
a congressional response to relieve the recognized hardship faced by
25. The historical development of restricted stock options as .traced by the Tax Court,
Harold S. Divine, 59 T.C. 152 (1972), indicated that statutory stock option plans were to be
treated differently from other kinds of stock options. Citing S. REP. No. 2375, 81st Cong., 2d
Sess. 59 (1950), the Tax Court supplied emphasis to the wording which supported its thesis:
"[S]ince the options which qualify for special treatment are regarded as incentive devices
rather than compensation, no deduction is allowed. . . ." 59 T.C. at 166. The Tax Court
presupposed that "the treatment prescribed by Congress for statutory stock options follows
closely the treatment which had been prescribed by those pre-1950, cases which had found
stock options to be simply capital purchase transactions." Id. See id. at 164, citing Rossheim
v. Commissioner, 92 F.2d 247 (3d Cir. 1937); Merhengood Corp. v. Helvering, 89 F.2d 972
(D.C. Cir. 1937); Bothwell v. Commissioner, 77 F.2d 35 (10th Cir. 1935); Gardner-Denver Co.
v. Commissioner, 75 F.2d 38 (7th Cir. 1935); Omaha Nat'l Bank v. Commissioner, 75 F.2d
434 (8th Cir. 1935); Herbert H. Springford, 41 B.T.A. 1001 (1940); Charles E. Adams, 39
B.T.A. 387 (1939); Gordon M. Evans, 38 B.T.A. 1406 (1938); Delbert B. Geeseman, 38 B.T.A.
258 (1938).
The distinction drawn by the Tax Court concerned the purpose of the option plan. In the
pre-1950 cases, if the courts determined that the stock option was compensatory in nature,
the employee would be required to pay tax on the spread and the corporation would be
allowed a deduction in the amount of the value of the spread for purposes of computing
taxable income; if the option was designed to induce the employee to purchase stock to
increase the corporation's capitalization, taxation would be postponed until time of disposi-
tion by the employee. See, e.g., Commissioner v. Smith, 324 U.S. 177 (1945) (where option
had no value when granted, increment in value at subsequent time of exercise taxable as
income to employee; Court acknowledged possibility that the option value at grant could be
treated as compensation under different circumstances); Commissioner v. Stone'sEstate, 210
F.2d 33 (3d Cir. 1954); Bothwell v. Commissioner, 77 F.2d 35 (10th Cir. 1935); Delbert B.
Geeseman, 38 B.T.A. 258 (1938).
26. The restricted stock option plan was first codified in section 130A of the Internal
Revenue Code of 1939. Int. Rev. Code of 1939, ch. 994, § 218(a), 64 Stat. 942 (1950). This
section was later included as section 421 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954. Int. Rev. Code
of 1954, ch. 736, § 421, 68A Stat. 142. The Luchman and Divine cases concerned this statute.
In 1964, Congress revised the treatment of statutory stock options and imposed new limits
upon section 421 in the process of recodifying it as section 424. Revenue Act of 1964, Pub. L.
No. 88-272, § 221(a), 78 Stat. 19. See note 8 supra.
The qualified stock option plan, found in section 422 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954,
largely replaced the restricted stock option plan. Sectioln 422(c)(1) requires that the option
price equal the fair market value of the stock on the date of grant in order for the employee
to avoid immediate taxation at date of exercise. Ir. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 422(c)(1).
27. I.T. 3795, 1946-1 CUM. BuLL. 15; T.D. 5507, 1946-1 CuM. BuLL 18.
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employees whereby they frequently would have to liquidate some of
their newly acquired shares to raise sufficient cash to finance pay-
ment of the tax.2s With the enactment of the restricted stock option
provisions, Congress removed these unfavorable tax consequences
by treating all spreads as incentives and postponing taxation until
time of disposition of the stock. 0 The Tax Court was convinced that
no reduction could be allowed against concurrent earnings and prof-
its because a corporate income tax deduction for the option spread
at exercise expressly was proscribed and the income tax treatment
of an item generally should determine its earnings and profits treat-
ment.
30
28. The Senate Report stated:
The rule applied under existing regulations is that an employee exercising an
option to purchase stock receives taxable income at the time the option is
exercised to the extent of the difference between the market value of the stock
at the time of exercise and the option. . . price. . . .Since the employee does
not realize cash income at the time the option is exercised, the imposition of a
tax at that time often works a real hardship. An immediate sale of a portion of
the stock acquired under the option may be necessary in order to finance the
payment of the tax. This... reduces the effectiveness of the option as an
incentive device.
S. REP. No. 2375, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. (1950), in 2 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News 3115 (1950).
29. "[MNo tax will be imposed at the time of exercise of a 'restricted stock option' or at
the time the option is granted and the gain realized by the sale of the stock acquired through
exercise of the option will be taxed as long-term capital gain." Id.
30. See 59 T.C. at 162; 50 T.C. at 624.
The Tax Court also relied upon construction of the Code to support its result. Luckman
contended that the purpose of section 421(a)(3), Int. Rev. Code of 1954, ch. 736, § 421(a)(3),
68A Stat. 142 ("no amount other than the price paid under the option shall be considered as
received by any such corporation for the share so transferred") was merely to limit the taxable
gain that a corporation received when it issued treasury stock pursuant to a restricted stock
option. 50 T.C. at 625. The Tax Court stated that it refused to relegate the status of section
421(a)(3) to a "useless appendage" because section 1032 already provided that "no gain or
loss shall be recognized to a corporation on the receipt of money or other property in exchange
for stock (including treasury stock) of such corporation." Id. at 626. The Tax Court reasoned
that Congress must have included section 421(a)(3) to proscribe any reduction in earnings
and profits, since if no amount was considered received, no amount could be considered as
an item of expense which reduces earnings and profits. 50 T.C. at 628.
The Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, however, held that section 421(a)(3) was
intended to limit taxable gain received by the corporation when it granted restricted stock
options in the form of stdck of a parent or subsidiary corporation rather than the stock of the
employer corporation. The court of appeals thus found in section 421(a)(3) a congressional
intent different from that in section 1032, so as not to render the former section a "useless
appendage." 418 F.2d at 385-86. *
The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit adhered to the position taken by the court of
appeals in Luckman. Section 421(a)(3) was not a "useless appendage" because section 1032
did not prevent recognition of gain on the sale of stock by an "affiliated" corporation. 500
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The Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, however, correctly
identified the failure of the Tax Court to recognize financial reality:
the emphasis upon the option as incentive to the employee in the
legislative history' is not dispositive in view of the Supreme Court's
holding in Commissioner v. LoBue12 that the bargain spread is com-
pensatory even when designed as an incentive to spur the employee
on to greater efforts for the corporation by giving him an ownership
interestss Even though LoBue concerned a nonstatutory stock op-
tion,34 the tax inducements provided by Congress to facilitate par-
ticipation in option plans by employees should not work a change
in the fufidamental nature of the option itself from the standpoint
of the corporation. As compensation, the courts of appeals rea-
soned,35 the expense to the corporation entailed in the bargain
F.2d at 1053-54. Not finding any express proscription of an earnings and profits reduction,
the court of appeals held that if Congress desired to prohibit a reduction, it would have done
so explicitly. Id. at 1056.
31. Both appellate courts noted deficiencies in the legislative history, particularly that the
Senate Report was in many places inconsistent with the plain language of the Code and thus
could not be trusted. For example, both courts noted that the Senate Report incorrectly
stated that employees could exercise a restricted stock option only if they remained in the
employ of the company after acquiring the option. See 500 F.2d at 1056; 418 F.2d at 386-87.
32. 351 U.S. 243 (1956).
33. The Court stated: "LoBue received a very substantial economic and financial benefit
from his employer prompted by the employer's desire to get better work from him. This is
'compensation for personal service'. . . ." Id. at 247.
34. Without the special tax treatment accorded statutory stock options, see INT. REv. CODn
oF 1954, §§ 421-25, nonstatutory stock options or ordinary bargain purchases are a form of
compensation for services rendered taxable to the employee as ordinary income. See Commis-
sioner v. LoBue, 351 U.S. 243, 247-48 (1956); Commissioner v. Smith, 324 U.S. 177, 180-82
(1945). See note 27 supra & accompanying text.
The existence of the LoBue precedent had not gone unnoticed by the Tax Court. In its
Luckman opinion, the court summarily distinguished LoBue with the assertion that the
Congress had provided that restricted stock options were not compensation, but incentives.
50 T.C. at 628. This attempt to distinguish LoBue, however, overlooks the fact that the
Supreme Court had characterized the stock options in LoBue as incentive devices also, yet
found them to constitute compensation for the employee. 351 U.S. at 247. In Divine, the Tax
Court returned to its attempt to distinguish LoBue with even less success, dismissing the
precedent as inapplicable because it did not address statutory stock options or corporate
earnings and profits. This time around, the court did not bother to advance any reason for
attaching significance to the fact that LoBue concerned a nonstatutory option. See 59 T.C.
at 170. Furthermore, although the Tax Court was correct in stating that reduction of earnings
and profits was not a litigated issue in LoBue, the Supreme Court began its analysis of the
case with the assertion that the exercise of LoBue's option had reduced the worth of the
corporate employer to its stockholders. 351 U.S. at 245.
35. The appellate court in Divine stated: "Compensation paid to and received by the
employees of a business are, of course, business 'expenses of producing gross receipts' and
380
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spread is a cost incurred in the production of gross receipts and
therefore properly deductible from earnings and profits."
A potential problem for the contention that Congress did not
intend to alter the fundamental nature of the stock option in author-
izing the restricted stock option is the fact that it specifically disal-
lowed any business expense deduction under section 162 of the Code
for the corporation in connection with the granting of the option. 37
Unlike the postponement of taxation for the employee, this provi-
sion cannot be explained as a device to facilitate use of the plans;
indeed the disallowance of a business expense deduction might re-
move one inducement for corporations to offer restricted stock op-
tions. The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit in Divine catego-
rized the-disallowance of deduction as a quid pro quo exacted by
Congress to compensate for the temporary loss of revenue caused by
deferred taxation of the employee's gain.38 Because of the likelihood
of different tax rates being applied to the corporation and its em-
ployees and because the employees ultimately were to be taxed on
the basis of the speculative capital gain accruing to them upon
disposition of the stock purchased," however, refusing deduction to
the corporation would provide only a very approximate quid pro quo
for the deferred taxation of employees.
A more likely explanation for the refusal of deduction is suggested
by the congressional awareness of the potential for abuse inherent
in tle stock option, in that such an option holds the possibility of
being used to compensate officers in such a manner as to convert
therefore reduce earnings and profits." 500 F.2d at 1051. See also Luckman v. Commissioner,
418 F.2d 381, 384 (1969).
36. Two Revenue Rulings provided the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit with further
support for its conclusion that earnings and profits should be reduced. 500 F.2d at 1052. The
Internal Revenue Service (IRS) had declared that all awards of bonus stock to employees
constitute business expenses which reduced earnings and profits by the fair market value of
the transferred stock, regardless of whether the value exceeded the corporation's cost basis.
Rev. Rul. 69-75, 1969-1 Cumi. BuLL. 52; Rev. Rul. 62-217, 1962-2 CuM. BuLL. 59. The court
asserted that the only difference between bonus stock and a stock option is that in the latter
case the employee pays something for the stock whereas in the former case he pays nothing.
500 F.2d at 1052. Adopting the language and the rationale of Commissioner v. LoBue, 351
U.S. 243, 245 (1956), the court in Divine stated: "[IMt remains that in both instances, 'at
the end of these transactions, [the corporate] employer [is] worth. less to its stockhold-
ers." 500 F.2d at 1052.
37. See INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 421(a)(2).
38. 500 F.2d at 1053.
39. See note 10 supra.
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ordinary corporate income into capital gains." By making the im-
mediate tax consequences of the stock option more expensive for the
corporation than would be the direct payment of cash to an em-
ployee," Congress may well have intended to ensure that a corpora-
tion would be induced to use the device only for its incentive value
rather than as an inexpensive method for distributing corporate
income.4 2 Disparate treatment of an expense item, refusing a deduc-
tion from taxable income while permitting a reduction of earnings
and profits for the item, is not uncommon where tax accounting
furthers a different purpose from that of financial accounting; 3 the
need to reduce tax avoidance would justify providing a method of
tax accounting that does not accord with the financial reality of the
compensation expense."
Just as the Tax Court's rationale for refusing any reduction in
earnings and profits is marred by the failure to recognize any actual
cost to the corporation resulting from the bargain spread, however,
the alternative method of tax accounting utilized by the appellate
courts pays insufficient attention to the possibility of unwarranted
40. The Senate Report indicates that Congress wanted to eliminate some of the abuses of
stock options:
The status of a "restricted stock option" will be denied if the recipient of the
option owns directly or indirectly more than 10 percent of the combined voting
power of all classes of stock of the employer corporation or of the parent corpora-
tion at the time the option is granted. This rule is intended to prevent the use
of stock options by employers who seek merely to convert the earnings of a
corporation from ordinary income into a capital gain.
S. REP. No. 2375, 81st Cong., 2d Seass. (1950), in 2 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News 3115 (1950).
41. A direct cash payment as compensation of course would be deductible from the corpo-
ration's taxable inc6me as a business expense. INT. R v. CODE OF 1954, § 162.
42. The Senate Report noted: "Since the options which qualify for special treatment are
regarded as incentive devices rather than compensation, no deduction is allowed the corpora-
tion. .. with respect to a transfer of stock pursuant to a restricted stock option." S. Rm.
No. 2375, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. (1950), in 2 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News 3115 (1950).
43. For example, no deduction is allowed for extraordinary expenses or for taxes paid to
the federal government, but a reduction of earnings and profits is permitted. R.M. Weyer-
haeuser, 33 B.T.A. 594, 597 (1935). See B. Brrrnm & J. Eusric., supra note 12, at 7.03, 7-
13.
44. Both appellate courts advanced a financial-reality argument to support their holdings
that the bargain-spread expense should reduce earnings and profits, arguing that a similar
financial benefit extended in the form of cash, which could be used to purchase corporate
stock, unquestionably would justify reduction of earnings and profits. 500 F.2d at 1056-57;
418 F.2d at 384. As one student commentator noted, however: "This argument is subject to
the. . . criticism that it ignores the form of the transaction; there would be no statutory stock
option if this form of payment were used." Note, Employee Stock Options: The Effect Upon
A Corporation's Earnings and Profits, 33 MD. L. Rsv. 190, 208 (1973).
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tax benefits created by the failure to identify precisely what cost is
incurred by the corporation. Rapid's employees who exercised re-
stricted options received the substantial value of the spread as com-
pensation without being required to pay any tax thereon until dispo-
sition of the stock. In addition, all shareholders subsequently re-
ceived tax-free distributions in the form of returns of capital once
the earnings and profits account was depleted.45 Nothing in the
legislative history preceding the creation of restricted stock options"
indicates that Congress intended to provide this "bonanza"4 of ben-
efits to employees and shareholders.
Insofar as the effect on the shareholders of the corporation, the
Court of Apjeals for the Second Circuit in Divine attempted to
defend the tax bonanza as necessary to encourage corporations to
provide stock option plans for their employees; if no reduction of
earnings and profits is allowed, the court asserted, the use of statu-
tory stock options might be unattractive because of inequities that
could be imposed on pre-option shareholders."' Although sharehold-
ers sometimes have the opportunity to vote on the granting of a
statutory stock option plan,49 they frequently are unaware of the
possibility that a plan may cost the corporation more than a direct
cash bonus given to employees since a cash bonus would be deducti-
ble from the corporation's income.5 When an employee exercises an
45. See note 15 supra & accompanying text.
46. See note 25 supra & accompanying text.
47. 500 F.2d at 1059 (dissenting opinion).
48. 500 F.2d at 1056.
49. NT. Pav. CoDm oF 1954, § 422(b)(1) provides: "[iThe [qualified stock] option is
granted pursuant to a plan which includes the aggregate number of shares which may be
issued under options, and the employees (or class of employees) eligible to receive options,
and which is approved by the stockholders of the granting corporation within 12 months
before or after the date such plan is adopted." Code section 423(b)(2) places an identical
shareholder approval requirement on employee stock purchase plans.
Shareholder approval was not required for restricted stock options, although most corpora-
tions did ask for shareholder ratification. Griswold, The Mysterious Stock Option, 51 Ky. L.J.
246, 258 (1962). Former section 421(d)(5), repealed by Revenue Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-
272, § 221(a), 78 Stat. 63, provided: "If the grant of an option is subject to approval by
stockholders, the date of grant of the option shall be determined as if the option had not been
subject to such approval."
50. One authority has contended that pre-option shareholders generally labor under the
misapprehension that statutory stock option plans do not cost them anything. See Griswold,
supra note 49, at 257-59. Since no cash distributions are made out of operating accounts, there
exists an outward appearance that corporate capital is increasing by the amount of the option
price paid by the employee into the corporate treasury and that the employee is being
compensated at no cost to the corporation. In reality, the cost of the option spread is borne
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option to purchase at a price below market value, the equity of all
current shareholders in the corporation is diluted. In one sense the
cost of the spread offered is borne not by the corporation, but by the
individual shareholders. To disallow any deduction from earnings
and profits would aggravate the inequities suffered by pre-option
stockholders because of the greater possibility that all cash distribu-
tions made by the corporation would be treated as dividends as
opposed to returns of capital for personal income tax purposes."
Should pre-option shareholders become cognizant of the actual cost
of the plan to the corporation and its effect on individual share
holdings, the possibility exists that shareholders would not approve
the grant of statutory stock option plans at all,52 thus frustrating the
congressional intent to promote utilization of the device.
This bonanza, however, is an unjustified exception to the general
tax policy that taxpaying entities should be taxed on benefits re-
ceived, regardless of form, at the time of receipt.-3 By the exercise
of their options, employees become stockholders and thus, would
receive a multiple benefit in the deferred taxation of their receipt
of the bargain-price stock and in the possibility of avoiding dividend
treatment of corporate distributions if the appellate court method
of tax accounting is followed. As noted by the Tax Court, such a
compounding of tax benefits normally is not allowed without ex-
press congressional authorization." Not only did Congress not spe-
cifically provide for such multiple tax benefits for restricted tax
options, its modifications of the tax laws seemed aimed more at
facilitating employee participation rather than at contriving addi-
tional tax benefits to induce corporations to offer the plans. Had
Congress been concerned specifically with enticing shareholders
into causing management to offer restricted stock options to em-
ployees, the more certain inducement would have been to allow a
deduction against the corporation's taxable income for the bargain
spread inherent in the option. Instead of providing such a tax incen-
by individual shareholders, who each incur a small part of the expense through a reduction
in their ownership percentage. A direct cash bonus payment to an employee may cost the
shareholders and corporation far less than the grant of a section 421 option. Id. See also 39
U. CN. L. Rzv. 384, 388 (1970).
51. See Luckinan v. Commissioner, 418 F.2d 381, 387 (1969) (Congress said not to have
intended to impose the cost of the option spread on pre-option shareholders).
52. 500 F.2d at 1054.
53. Griswold, supra note 49, at 248.
54. 59 T.C. at 168-69, citing White v. United States, 305 U.S. 281 (1938); New Colonial
Ice Co. v. Helvering, 292 U.S. 435 (1934).
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tive to the corporation and its shareholders, however, Congress
merely deferred taxation of the employee to avoid forcing him to sell
a portion of the stock immediately upon exercise of the option in
order to raise sufficient cash to pay the tax."
Rather than furthering legislative intent, the reduction of earn-
ings and profits by the amount of the bargain spread at exercise as
advocated by the appellate courts frustrates one clearly expressed
goal of Congress. Restricted stock option plans are defined to in-
clude only those options granted to individuals holding no more
than 10 percent of the voting power of all classes of the corporation's
stock at the time the option was granted." The legislative history is
very clear in indicating that the reason for the limitation was to
reduce the likelihood of the plans being used to convert corporate
profits taxable as ordinary income into capital gains taxable at re-
duced rates. 7 Under the accounting method utilized by the appel-
late courts in Divine and Luckman, it would be quite possible in a
rising market for a controlling group of shareholders in a closely held
corporation to exercise selectively options granted to themselves as
employees in such a manner as to reduce earnings and profits in an
amount sufficient to minimize the likelihood that any concurrent
corporate distributions would be taxed as dividends5 Because the
exercise of the options would not reduce the cash flow of the corpora-
tion, the possibility of a corporate distribution would not be dimin-
ished; instead of being a dividend taxable as ordinary income to the
shareholders, however, the distribution would be a tax-free return
of capital. By allowing reduction of earnings and profits in the
amount of the option spread at exercise, the appellate courts thus
would encourage tax avoidance that Congress specifically intended
to reduce."
55. See note 28 supra.
56. See INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 424(b)(3).
57. See note 40 supra.
58. See notes 14-15 supra & accompanying text.
59. Congress reaffirmed its desire to avoid undue tax avoidance by the enactment of Code
provisions pertaining to qualified stock options. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 421-22. The House
Report accompanying the Revenue Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-272, 78 Stat. 19, states: 'Tor
an individual to receive full qualified stock option treatment, he must not sell.., his stock
within 3 years of the date of exercise of the stock option .... This provision is designed to
give assurance that the key executive involved actually maintains a "stake in the business"
and is not merely selling the stock shortly after he receives it, thus. . . converting ordinary
compensation into capital gain." H.R. REP. No. 749, 88th Cong., 2d Sess. (1963), in 1 U.S.
Code Cong. & Ad. News 1375 (1964).
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THE FINANCIAL METHOD
Because of the deficiencies of the earnings and profits treatments
of restricted stock options by the Tax Courts and the two appellate
courts in Luckman and Divine, the financial accounting method
merits closer attention. Without referencing specifically the finan-
cial accounting procedure, the Tax Court observed in Divine that if
a reduction were to be allowed, it should be measured by the option
spread existing at grant rather than at exercise;" this time would
accord with the Accounting Principles Board (APB) recommenda-
tion concerning options for which the price and number of shares
offered is settled at time of grant." Otherwise, nowhere in the four
reports of the Luckman-Divine litigation is there any indication
that the taxpayers, the Government, or the appellate courts consid-
ered the methods adopted by the accounting profession. This over-
sight is unfortunate because the GAAP alternative could avoid the
shortcomings of the Tax Court and appellate court holdings by rec-
ognizing that the option spread at exercise reflects factors other
than the corporation's compensation of the employee.
Relevant considerations for determining the effect of the bargain
spread upon the corporation are illustrated in the reasons given by
the Board for accepting or rejecting certain dates as the appropriate
benchmark for measuring the option expense.2 The date on which
60. 59 T.C. at 165.
61. AICPA, OPINIONS OF THE AccouimNo PRiNcipLes BOARn No. 25, ACCOUTING FOR STOCK
IsSuED TO EmpLoYEs 10 (1972) [hereinafter cited as APB No. 25].
Although procedures suggested by Opinions of the Accounting Principles Board may not
be followed by all members of the profession in all financial statements, departures from the
Opinions are to be disclosed in notes to such statements; accountants departing from the
suggested procedures assume the burden of justifying the departure. Id. at 481.
62. See id.; AICPA, AccourmGo Rxsm~cH BuLnrLn No. 43, ch. 13B (1953) [hereinafter
cited as ARB No. 43, ch. 13B]. The accounting principles developed iln ARB No. 43, ch. 13B
were reaffirmed in 1972 by the Accounting Principles Board except that "quoted market
price" was substituted for "fair value" as the standard for pricing stock and alternative
measurement dates were adopted to reflect the development of compensation plans utilizing
variable numbers of shares of stock or variable option or purchase prices. APB No. 25, supra
note 61, 4.
In one category of options, financial accounting procedures offer superficial support to the
Tax Court decisions in Luckman and Divine. APB No. 25 recognizes that some plans are not
compensatory in nature; the Board has concluded that a noncompensatory plan has at least
four essential characteristics:
(a) substantially all full-time employees meeting limited employment qualifica-
tions may participate (employees owning a specified percent of the outstanding
stock and executives may be excluded), (b) stock is offered to eligible employees
equally or based on a uniform percentage of salary or wages (the plan may limit
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the corporation first decides to offer an option plan was rejected as
irrelevant because no cost accrued to the corporation merely by the
fact of the decision to offer the plan. At the other end of the time
spectrum, the date the employee disposes of stock purchased pur-
suant to an option plan, was found irrelevant because the timing of
that event concerned only the employee's investment judgment as
a shareholder without any relationship to whatever services the
employee may have performed for the corporation." The Luckman-
Divine appellate court alternative, measurement on the date that
the employee exercises the option, was rejected for reasons similar
to those for not using the disposition date: the time the employee
exercises his option is an investment judgment having "no discern-
ible relation to [the optionholder's] status as an employee .... ))65
Two other possible dates for measurement, the date that the em-
ployee first may exercise the option and the date by which time the
employee satisfies all prerequisites for exercise of the option, were
determined to be substantially similar in effect upon the option's
expense to the corporation." Although these two dates were plau-
sible alternatives as times for the measurement of cost, the Board
rejected them in favor of the date the option was granted because
the spread existing at grant would better reflect the cost that the
corporation intended to bear in making the option available to the
employee, 7 provided that the number of shares to be offered and the
price of offering were specified at the time of grant." Implicit in the
rationale for using the date of grant as a benchmark is the seemingly
the number of shares of stock that an employee may purchase through the plan),
(c) the time permitted for exercise of an option or purchase right is limited to a
reasonable period, and (d) the discount from the market price of the stock is no
greater than would be reasonable in an offer of stock to stockholders or others.
Id. 7. Although employee stock purchase plans authorized by section 423 of the Internal
Revenue Code are categorized expressly by the Board as noncompensatory, id., it does not
follow that the Tax Court was correct in labeling the restricted stock options in Divine and
Luchman as being something other than compensation. Only restricted options issued under
Code section 424(c)(3)(B) must be available to all employees on a nondiscriminatory basis
as required by the Board's first essential characteristic for noncompensatory plans.
63. ARB No. 43, oh. 13B, supra note 62, 7.
64. Id.
65. Id. S.
66. Id. 1 9.
67. Id. 1 10. See also Jacoby, Earnings and Profits: A Not So Theoretical Concept-Some
Winds of Change, N.Y.U. 29tH INsT. o FM. TAx. 649, 662-67 (1971) (advocating reduction
of earnings and profits by option spread at grant).
68. See APB No. 25, supra note 61, 1 10.
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reasonable assumption that the corporation would not in effect give
the employee a "blank check" by which he would be compensated
at a cost uncontrolled by the corporation. Of the possible dates for
which a compensation cost could be computed, only the date of
grant is in the exclusive control of the corporation; it is thus the cost
which could be computed on that date which the corporation in-
tended to bear as an expense of compensating the employee."
When the number of shares of stock to be offered pursuant to the
plan or the option price is not determined at the date the option is
granted," however, no compensation expense can be computed on
that date. Accordingly, because of the growing complexity of stock
option plans,7' the APB has provided an alternative to the date of
grant as a measurement date, substituting instead the date when
the number and price of the shares first becomes known.72 The two
dates, of course, will be the same in a straightforward plan that does
not vary the price or quantity of shares offered at the date the option
is granted.3
The rationale the accounting profession used for accepting or re-
jecting the various times for measuring the corporation's compensa-
tion expense recognizes a distinction that the Tax Court and the
appellate courts in the Luckman-Divine litigation overlooked,
namely, the fact that the stock option affects the corporation and
the employee differently. This distinction is crucial to determining
the nature of the corporation's compensation expense. While ac-
cepting that there was an expense to the corporation entailed in an
option plan, the appellate court in Divine did not pause to consider
carefully the nature of that expense, merely identifying it as the
opportunity cost of selling stock to the employee at a reduced cost
instead of selling it on the open market at full value.74 It offered no
explanation for measuring that cost at the time the employee exer-
cised the option, but it apparently chose that date because it is then
that the employee receives a direct economic benefit from having
received the option.75
69. See ARB No. 43, ch. 13B, supra note 62, 10.
70. See INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 424(c)(2) (variable price restricted stock option).
71. APB No. 25, supra note 61, 1 2.
72. Id. T 10.
73. Id.
74. 500 F.2d at 1057.
75. See id. See also Commissioner v. LoBue, 351 U.S. 244, 248 (1956) (holding that the
employee taxpayer realized income at the time he exercised his stock option rather than at
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Despite the economic importance to the employee of the time of
exercise, the corporation incurs its cost at an earlier point. When the
corporation commits itself to the terms of an option for a certain
employee, it must set aside a certain quantity of stock to be sold to
the employee in accordance with the option. Having thus lost con-
trol over that stock at the time of commitment, the corporation
concurrently forgoes the alternative of selling it on the open mar-
ket.76 It is the difference between the option price and the market
value of the stock existing at the commitment date that is the op-
portunity cost the corporation incurs to provide the option to the
employee, and it is that cost which should reduce earnings and
profits as a compensation expense.
Also implicit in the reasoning of the APB is the recognition that
the economic benefits of a stock option for an employee flow from
two sources, the compensation intended by the corporation and the
speculative gain the employee receives as a result of his investment
judgment." Although the bargain spread existing at the time the
employer grants a certain option to an employee reflects the em-
ployer's judgment as to the economic benefit it wishes to confer as
compensation,78 the benefit the employee eventually receives upon
exercise of the option and ultimate disposition of the stock is a
gamble dependent upon market factors and the employee's skills as
an investor.79 One premise of the stock option device is that the
granting of an ownership interest in the corporation may spur the
employee on to greater efforts for the corporation;" the efforts of one
employee, nevertheless, may be only one very small factor affecting
the market value of the corporation's stock. 8' While recognizing the
economic reality of the compensation expense inherent in an option
the time he received it). The employee, of course, would be taxed for gain accruing at the
time he exercised a restricted stock option were it not for the fact that Code section 421(a) (1)
results in deferral of the tax. See notes 27, 34 supra.
76. See ARB No. 43, ch. 13B, supra note 62, 11. Although the accounting profession
originally tied the opportunity cost to the date of grant, id., the commitment date for variable
plans would seem -to entail similar economic consequences for the corporation's alternatives
for selling its stock on the open market. See APB No. 25, supra note 61, 10 (noting that
the commitment date is the first time that the corporation knows the number of shares an
employee is entitled to receive).
77. See ARB No. 43, ch. 13B, supra note 62, 1 8.
78. Id. 10.
79. "As an incentive device, stock options have a very large element of lottery in them."
Griswold, supra note 49, at 255.
80. See Divine v. Commissioner, 500 F.2d 1041, 1057 (2d Cir. 1974).
81. Griswold, supra note 49, at 221.
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plan for the corporation, 2 the Luckman-Divine appellate courts
failed to perceive the concomitant reality that the option spread at
exercise correlates only weakly with the employee efforts that the
corporation intends to compensate by use of an option plan.
Neither case law nor tax policies preclude following the financial
accounting method of reducing earnings and profits by the bargain
spread existing at a time earlier than the date of exercise. In
Commissioner v. Smith, 3 the Supreme Court stated: "It of course
does not follow that in other circumstances . . the option itself,
rather than the proceeds of its exercise, could not be found to be the
only intended compensation."" The Court of Appeals for the Sixth
Circuit in McNamara v. Commissioners found an occasion when
the grant of an option, rather than its exercise, constituted compen-
sation to an employee when such was the intent of the parties.86 This
emphasis upon intent in McNamara comports with the emphasis
upon intent inherent in the financial accounting method for treating
the option spread: since the corporation normally would not intend
to write the employee a "blank check" by compensating him in an
amount over which it had no control, the compensation intended is
the spread existing when the corporation still has control over the
option, normally the time of grant. 87 Furthermore, Commissioner v.
LoBue, the case upon which the Luckman-Divine appellate courts
relied, 9 does not compel reducing earnings and profits by the spread
at exercise, since that Supreme Court case concerned the tax treat-
ment of the employee exercising an option, not the treatment of the
corporation granting it.2 Moreover, four Justices would have
reached a different result in LoBue: two, because the issue of the
time at which LoBue's tax should be measured was not properly
before the Court; 1 two others, because they would select the time
82. 418 F.2d at 384; 500 F.2d at 1052.
83. 324 U.S. 177 (1945).
84. Id. at 181 (dictum).
85. 210 F.2d 505 (6th Cir. 1954).
86. Id. at 508.
87. See note 69 supra & accompanying text.
88. 351 U.S. 243 (1956).
89. 500 F.2d at 1051-52; 418 F.2d at 384.
90. See 351 U.S. at 248-49.
91. Id. at 250 (Frankfurter & Clark, JJ.). The issue had not been raised before the Tax
Court or the appellate court, and the Justices saw "no reason for departing from the general
rule whereby [the Supreme] Court abstains from passing on such an issue in a tax case when
raised here for the first time." Id.
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at which -the employer's commitment to the option for a certain
employee became definite as the date to measure the employee's
compensation. 2
With one modification, the financial accounting method of treat-
ing stock option expense also would conform to the requirements of
tax policy. Financial accounting procedures would require the cor-
poration to accrue the compensation expense of the optionr in each
period during which the employee performs the services that are
compensated by the option. 3 Such a procedure might conflict with
the tax policy that requires expenses to be certain before a deduc-
tion is permitted,94 since it is possible that the option granted might
never be exercised. 5 Accounting procedures call for subsequent ad-
justments to be made to compensation expense in the event that
options are not exercised, 5 but this procedure would appear unde-
sirable for tax purposes. 7 Delaying the reduction in earnings and
profits until the period in which an option is exercised would mini-
mize the need for readjustment of prior tax years and comply with
92. Id. at 250 (Harlan & Burton, JJ.). Justice Harlan stated: "It was at [the time the right
to the option vested] that the corporation conferred a benefit upon [the employee]. At the
exercise of the option, the corporation 'gave' the [employee] nothing; it simply satisfied a
previously-created legal obligation. That transaction, by which the [employee] merely con-
verted his asset from an option into stock, should be of no consequence for tax purposes." Id.
at 250-51.
93. See APB No. 25, supra note 61, 13.
94. Before a deduction can be taken by a corporation for an "ordinary and necessary"
business expense, the expense must have been realized. INT. Rnv. CoDE oF 1954, § 162(a). For
example, no deduction is permitted for unrealized depreciation expenses. B. BrrrMx & J.
EusTIcE, supra note 12, 7.03, at 7-13. One requirement of the realization concept for tax
purposes is that the expense be ascertainable. See American Automobile Ass'n v. United
States, 367 U.S. 688 (1961). The expense of some stock options has been recognized as giving
rise to an "actual" business expense to a corporation. P. GRADY, AccoUNTING ESEsuCH STUDY
No. 7, INVENTORY OF GENERALLY AccEm ACCOUNTING PINCIPLES FOR Busmms ENTrE rsEs
215 (1965).
95. ARB No. 43, ch. 13B, supra note 62, 10, states: "In most of the cases under discussion
.. .the only important contingency involved is the continuance of the grantee in the employ-
ment of the corporation, a matter very largely within the control of the grantee and usually
the main objective of the grantor." There is the further contingency that the market price of
the corporation's stock might fall such that exercise of the option would be economically
disadvantageous to the employee. Perhaps less likely, given the extended time period during
which the option may be exercised, see INT. Rav. CoDE OF 1954, § 424(b)(4), but still possible,
is the contingency that the employee simply might not have sufficient resources to purchase
stock even at a bargain price. None of these contingencies would affect the cost to the
corporation of each share sold pursuant to an option plan, however; they would only affect
the total number of shares sold.
96. APB No. 25, supra note 61, 1 15.
97. See note 94 supra.
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the tax principle that expenses be certain before they are afforded
recognition."8
Compliance with the financial accounting method for treatment
of option spreads as compensation expense for the purposes of earn-
ings and profits also accords with the specific legislative intent of
the restricted stock option scheme. Because the principal change in
tax treatment worked by enactment of the statutory plan, deferred
taxation of the employee's gain,9 is not affected by allowing a reduc-
tion in corporate earnings and- profits, the employee's ability to
participate in the plan is not diminished. Inasmuch as the option
spread at grant is limited statutorily to 15 percent of the stock's
value,'00 the threat of selective reduction of earnings and profits in
order to achieve tax-free distributions of capital posed by the
Luckman-Divine appellate court method is negligible,'01 thus pro-
tecting the congressional goal of assuring that restricted option
plans not be used to convert ordinary corporate income into income
taxable at reduced rates. 02
Furthermore, use of the financial accounting method would give
effect to the emphasis Congress placed upon the restricted stock
option as an incentive device as opposed to compensation. 3 Al-
though the holding in Commissioner v. LoBue04 requires that the
expense of an incentive device be treated as a compensation ex-
pense,' 5 proper attention to the financial accounting method indi-
cates that the option spread at exercise is not the cost of the device
to the corporation. Reduction of earnings and profits by the spread
98. Delaying recognition of the compensation expense until the time the option is exercised
also preserves some symmetry in the tax treatment of stock options. Were it not for the
deferred taxation of the employee provided by Code section 421(a)(1), his taxable event would
be the exercise of his option. Commissioner v. LoBue, 351 U.S. 243 (1956). Reducing earnings
and profits at that same time thus preserves temporal symmetry, at least from a theoretical
standpoint. The fact that the amount of the earnings and profits reduction by the corporation
is less than the total economic benefit the employee receives does not violate the principle of
symmetry since the amount of the reduction does include the full amount of the economic
benefit conferred by the corporation upon the employee; whatever additional economic bene-
fit that accrues to the employee is the result of the exercise of his investment judgment, not
compensation related to the services he performs for the corporation. See notes 64-65 supra
& accompanying text.
99. See note 28 supra & accompanying text.
100. INT. Rnv. CoDE oF 1954, § 424(b)(1).
101. See notes 45-47 supra & accompanying text.
102. See notes 56-59 supra & accompanying text.
103. See Harold S. Divine, 59 T.C. 152, 165-66 (1972).
104. 351 U.S. 243, 247 (1956).
105. See notes 32-33 supra & accompanying text.
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at exercise would be precluded, not because it is an incentive pay-
ment, but because it is not an expense borne by the corporation. The
option spread at exercise benefits the employee economically, allow-
ing him to share in the good fortune of the corporation; it is not an
economically significant event for the corporation, however, since
the corporation effectively lost control of the affected shares of stock
at the time it committed them to the option agreement with the
particular employee."' Thus the spread at exercise gives the em-
ployee an incentive without itself being a compensation expense for
the corporation. Accounting thusly for the stock option comports
with the congressional language to the effect that the exercise of the
option should not generate a business deduction for the corporation,
while it recognizes the economic opportunity cost of the option to
the corporation by permitting reduction of earnings and profits in
the amount of the spread existing at the time the corporation com-
mits stock to an option rather than selling it on the open market.
CONCLUSION
Reference to financial accounting procedures resolves the difficul-
ties surrounding the earnings and profits treatment of statutory
restricted stock options. By reducing earnings and profits by an
amount equal to the option spread existing on the date the corpora-
tion commits shares to an employee's option, normally the date the
option is granted, the financial accounting method recognizes the
economic opportunity cost that the Tax Court in the Luckman-
Divine litigation ignored while avoiding the tax bonanza created by
the appellate courts in that same litigation. The superiority of the
financial accounting methods stems from its recognition of the dif-
ferent economic effects of the restricted stock option upon the corpo-
ration and the employee and from its more precise identification of
the particular opportunity cost incurred by the corporation in offer-
ing such plans.
Because of the progressive extinction of restricted option plan6
worked by the Revenue Act of 1964,17 the precise problem raised in
the Luckman-Divine litigation will pass away within a few years as
the remaining outstanding options are exercised. ' Similar prob-
106. See note 69 supra & accompanying text.
107. Pub. L. No. 88-272, 78 Stat. 19.
108. See Baker, Employee Stock Options Under the Revenue Act of 1964, 20 TAx L. Rnv.
77, 83 (1964). See also note 8 supra.
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lems are raised, however, by the congressional substitutes, the qual-
ified stock option plan' 9 and the employee purchase plan,"' in that
Congress once again did not specify the earnings and profits treat-
ment to be afforded the plans. Treatment of employee stock pur-
chase plans poses the lesser problem since the financial accounting
treatment is in accord with the rather specific legislative history
indicating that the plans are intended primarily as a means of rais-
ing capital;"' thus no reduction in earnings and profits for compen-
sation is appropriate.
Qualified stock options raise the same potential for abuse that
exists with restricted stock options, but the alterations Congress
provided for the qualified option plans tend to support applying the
financial accounting methods in the same manner as has been advo-
cated for the restricted option plans. Congress specified that any
option spread existing at the time a qualified stock option is granted
would be taxed as compensation to the employee."2 As compensa-
tion to the employee, this spread at grant should reduce corporate
earnings and profits in the same manner as financial accounting
methods would demand for restricted stock options. Application of
financial accounting methods to qualified stock options would pre-
vent the threat of tax manipulation raised by the inappropriate
attention paid to the option spread at exercise for restricted stock
options by the Luckman-Divine appellate courts.
109. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, §§ 421-22.'
110. Id. §§ 421, 423.
111. Compare APB No. 23, supra note 61,117, with H.R. REP. No. 749,88th Cong., 2d Sess.
(1963). The essential purpose of employee stock purchase plans is to raise capital for the
corporation:
Some companies have made stock options available to all, or practically all,
of their employees. Taking advantage of the fact that the option may be granted
at 85 percent of the market price they make discount sales of the stock to their
employees generally. These are known as employee stock purchase plans. Where
stock options are used in this manner, they are designed primarily as a means
of raising capital; and, in such cases, the discounts from market price made
available to the employees usually correspond approximately with the costs the
company would otherwise incur in floating a new stock issue.
H.R. REP. No. 749, 88th Cong., 2d Seas. (1963), in 1 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News 1372-73
(1964).
112. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 422(c)(1).
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